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Justification and Legitimacy at War:
On the Sources of Moral Guidance
for Soldiers*
Christopher J. Finlay
Attempts to simplify ethics in war by claiming exclusive legitimate authority for
the law of armed conflict underestimate the moral complexities facing soldiers.
Soldiers risk wrongdoing if they refuse moral guidance that can independently
evaluate their legal permissions. State soldiers need to know when to object to
a legal duty to fight; nonstate fighters need to know when to disregard legal pro-
hibitions against fighting. And both might sometimes best discharge their moral
duties by following a bespoke rule departing from noncombatant immunity in a
principled way that has been designed for a particular conflict by an authorita-
tive leadership.
I. MORALITY AND LAW AT PEACE
If the title of Adil Ahmad Haque’s Law and Morality at War refers to a war
between law and morality in the context of armed conflict, then it is a
war that he thinks the law has already won. Moral philosophy helps inter-
pret the law and justifies its claim to legitimate authority. It even suggests
some amendments to improve it. But international law is generally all
we need to distinguish right from wrong in conducting armed conflict.
Whether seeking guidance as participants hoping to do the right thing
or as observers hoping to recognize it when we see it, following the law
of armed conflict (LOAC) directly and international law more generally
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at a workshop on Adil Haque’s Law
and Morality at War organized by the Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace.
My thanks to the participants for feedback and critical engagement and, in particular, to
Helen Frowe and Adil Haque for the invitation to participate and toHelen for detailed feed-
back on subsequentdrafts. I amgrateful to the two readers forEthics for theirhelpful comments.
Work for this article was supported by aMajor Research Fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust.
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offers the best chance of success. We should disregard other normative
sources as direct guides, eschewing in particular any more immediate ap-
peal to ordinary moral intuitions and principles.1
By arguing from reductive-individualist and cosmopolitan premises,
Haque’s account contributes in a novel and sophisticated way to a more
widespread view that, in fact, the morality and law of war are generally
at peace.2 Michael Walzer, Michael Ignatieff, and Jeremy Waldron have
each argued toward similar conclusions. Walzer acknowledged that mod-
ern just war theory is sourced in ideas with different histories and con-
trasting logics. But he finds in the central “War Convention” a moral jus
in bello that chimes with contemporary international law in permitting
soldiers to attack and be attacked, provided that they adhere to the de-
mands of noncombatant immunity (NCI) and regardless of whether
they have just cause.3 Waldron answers revisionist critics of NCI by argu-
ing that sucha “deadly serious convention” cannot rightfully bebreached,
however much moral responsibility civilians may bear for the wrongs jus-
tifying resort to war.4 And Ignatieff rejects apologetics for nonstate ter-
rorism by arguing that there is no third choice in resisting political op-
pression: either adhere peacefully to international human rights (IHR)
laws or resort to arms within the constraints of the LOAC. Like Haque,
he maintains that the law of war is the only valid “moral frame of refer-
ence” in armed conflict.5
On Haque’s account, the divergence that some revisionists trace be-
tween the LOAC and morality is largely illusory. He thinks that the as-
sumption they share with Walzer, that the LOAC strongly permits killing
in an unjust war, is based on a misunderstanding of the law. But whereas
Walzer and Waldron emphasize the degree to which morality supports
law, Haque draws on Joseph Raz to argue that existing law supports mo-
rality. The underlying morality is cosmopolitan, defined by duties that
“reflect our moral status as human beings and only interstitially reflect
our special relationships” (LMW, 9). The LOAChas “legitimate authority”
due to the “service” it performs by offering combatants a better chance of
discharging these duties than relying directly on moral intuitions and
case-by-case judgments about individuals.
1. Adil Ahmad Haque, Law and Morality at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2017), henceforth cited as LMW.
2. On premises, see LMW, 9.
3. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations,
3rd ed. (New York: Basic, 2000), chap. 3.
4. Jeremy Waldron, “Civilians, Terrorism, and Deadly Serious Conventions,” in Tor-
ture, Terror and Trade-Offs: Philosophy for the Whitehouse (Oxford: Oxford University Press:
2010), 80–110.
5. Michael Ignatieff, “Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Terrorism,” Social Research
69 (2002): 1137–58, 1152–53.
Finlay Justification and Legitimacy at War 577
This content downloaded from 129.234.039.154 on June 13, 2019 06:36:22 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
I argue that this “service view” is overly optimistic and, in a certain
sense, reductive. Neither the moral perspective of just war theory nor the
law can claim preeminence as the sole means of satisfying moral duty, de-
cisively defeating the other. Conflict between them therefore remains a
possibility. On the account of the ethics of armed conflict that I offer in-
stead, citizens facing the possibility of becoming combatants, and com-
batants facing war, have difficult judgments to make as they appeal to
multiple sources for guidance and have to adjudicate between them
when they clash—these include not only the law but also just war theory,
as well as the decisions of existing or emerging political authorities. So
even if the ethics and law of war are properly motivated entirely by the
moral status and rights of individuals as universal ends (and “only inter-
stitially [by] special relationships”; LMW, 9), I argue that the normative
means of pursuing and respecting those ends bear the inescapable im-
print of national institutions and particular political formations.
My argument has three parts. First, I argue that the law does, in fact,
permit the morally impermissible to state soldiers. The tensions between
morality and law are therefore sharper than Haque recognizes, and the
legal guidance available to warriors is more heavily laden with moral risk.
To minimize risk, state soldiers need just war theory for guidance in eval-
uating their legal permissions (Sec. II). On the other hand (Sec. III),
nonstate forces need the same source in order to question the default
legal prohibition on the use of force. And the ability of both to follow
the law is conditioned by existing or emerging sources of political au-
thority. Second, I argue (Secs. IV.A and IV.B) that framing the combat-
ant’s choice as a binary between following NCI and attempting the sort
of highly individuated reasoning that Haque identifies with just war re-
visionism obscures an intermediate possibility. A bespoke principle of
discrimination tailored to the contours of a specific conflict might some-
times track moral responsibility for wrongful threats and satisfy the re-
quirements of the service view better than combatant/noncombatant
discrimination. Again, political leadership is required to provide author-
itative and concrete guidance about the liable and immune categories
that the principle defines. And finally, I argue (Sec. IV.C) that where
the illegal practices permitted by a bespoke principle are morally justifi-
able, they are then also likely to be morally obligatory. The tension that
actors have to negotiate therefore isn’t between a duty (NCI) and a mere
permission, or between humanity and military necessity. Rather, it is be-
tween two opposing duties (humanitarianism in means vs. humanitari-
anism as an end). That such oppositions are possible means that we can-
not presume that the law will always override morality when the two offer
contradictory guidance.
All three problems point to the need for sources and practices of
moral judgment that are in some sense independent of the law.
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II. STATE-ON-STATE WARS: THE LICENSE TO KILL
Haque’s argument for harmony between morality and the law takes aim
at a belief widely shared by revisionists in just war theory (henceforth “re-
visionists”) about the permissiveness of the LOAC. They maintain that
there is a fundamental tension between what Jeff McMahan calls “deep
morality” and the law, that is, between, on the one hand, what morality
would demand if soldiers applied criteria of individual moral responsibil-
ity and liability directly when deciding whom to harm and, on the other,
the permissions and constraints defined by the LOAC.6
From the first perspective, only those defending against aggression
can claim moral justification for fighting and not those engaged in ag-
gression. Thewar privilege claimedby soldiers fighting for anunjust cause
(henceforth “unjust warriors”) cannot, therefore, be grounded directly
in defensive ethics or deeper moral principles such as the immunity of
the innocent. And there is a similar tension in international law itself.
The UN Charter outlaws war where it isn’t a defense against wrongful
war. But once a state has declared war or once an objective condition of
“armed conflict” is recognized between two states, the LOAC permits just
and unjust warriors alike to fight.7 Revisionists argue that if it is justifiable
for the law to permit killing by unjust warriors, then this must be due to
the aggregate effects of doing so. It might reduce the destructive effects
of wars overall, particularly on innocent people, by helping incentivize
restraint by unjust warriors. So, whereas the deep morality of war is non-
consequentialist, the law of war is grounded at least partly in rule conse-
quentialism.8
Haque rejects the need for such an account. The LOAC only pro-
vides what he calls a “weak permission” to unjust combatants at best.
Consequently, relations between law and morality are much less strained
than revisionists believe. This weak permission has two components.
First, the LOAC doesn’t prohibit unjust warriors from fighting in any
6. Jeff McMahan, “The Morality of War and the Law of War,” in Just and Unjust War-
riors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers, ed. David Rodin and Henry Shue (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2008), 19–43; Cécile Fabre, Cosmopolitan War (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2012), 12; Helen Frowe, Defensive Killing (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014), 164–65.
7. Yitzhak Benbaji, “The Moral Power of Soldiers to Undertake the Duty of Obedi-
ence,” Ethics 122 (2011): 43–73, 43–44; David Luban, “Just War Theory and the Laws of
War as Identical Twins,” Ethics and International Affairs 31 (2017): 433–40, 438. On condi-
tions for recognizing undeclared noninternational wars, see Luban, “Just War Theory,”
435.
8. McMahan, “Morality of War”; see also Jeff McMahan, “The Ethics of Killing in War,”
Ethics 114 (2004): 693–733, 729–33.
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fashion that hasn’t been defined as unlawful.9 And second, it grants pro-
tections: (unjust) warriors who attack ( just) enemy combatants inten-
tionally and harm noncombatants collaterally within the limits of pro-
portionality are immune from prosecution by foreign states. Missing
from a weak permission but present in a strong one is a positive legal jus-
tification for attempting to harm one’s enemies (LMW, 27). Haque
maintains that unjust warriors therefore do not have a privilege right
to kill, nor, therefore, do they have a liberty right. Moreover, they have
no claim right: unjust warriors have no claim against others that they
not prevent them from fighting (LMW, 25).
Let’s assume that Haque’s reading of the LOAC on its own terms is
correct. I think, nevertheless, that his interpretation of the unjust war-
rior’s legal rights misses something important by failing to take account
of the significance of states in the wider legal architecture. Taken as a
whole, the architecture consists not only of the LOAC and the interna-
tional jus ad bellum (chiefly sourced in the UN Charter) but also of sov-
ereign states and national law. States play three roles: first, they help con-
struct the architecture through treaties and conventional law, as well as
by maintaining common practices recognized as customary law; second,
they give life to some of its components by incorporating them within
domestic law;10 and third, they exercise legal powers that are indepen-
dent of international law but that complement it. This last function is di-
rectly relevant to the war privilege.
Individuals serving in state forces are not only permitted to fight but
also usually under a legal obligation to do so.11 The obligation arises
from the state’s power to oblige subjects legally to follow orders to fight
within the limits of the LOAC. This is true whether its subjects are ca-
reer soldiers, volunteers for a particular war, or conscripts. In the first
two cases, states contract with individuals; in the third, they impose duties
with or without consent. Whichever way it arises, the obligation is bind-
ing as a matter of domestic law even when governments initiate wars that
are unjustified under international law. Therefore, unjust warriors typi-
cally are legally obliged to fight when their countries engage in unjust
wars. And I presume that obligation implies permission. We may say that
such soldiers are permitted to kill insofar as they have a single privilege: a
liberty to fight but not a legal liberty not to fight.12
9. On Raz and weak permissions, see LMW, 32–34, 191.
10. Gary Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010), 15, 85–87.
11. For some early modern legal texts obligating soldiers to obey orders, see ibid., 342
n. 12.
12. Leif Wenar, “The Nature of Rights,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2005): 223–52;
David Rodin, War and Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002), 19–20.
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Haque is right, of course, to say that combatants cannot claim as of
right that their enemies not impede them in fulfilling their role, which
would be absurd. But that doesn’t preclude the possibility of claim rights
against others being bundled with the combatant privilege. For instance,
combatants presumably have claim rights against their own civilians not
to thwart them in serving the state. Moreover, civilians’ immunity from
attack is contingent on nonparticipation in hostilities against combat-
ants: this too might be interpreted as a claim right of combatants against
“enemy” civilians. And crucially, combatants have claims against neutral
parties. Neutral states are prohibited from interfering in a conflict in var-
ious ways, while combatants have claim rights to search neutral vessels
outside neutral waters.
Unjust warriors therefore usually have “strong” legal permissions to
fight and kill. Even so, however, it might be replied that this doesn’t con-
tradict Haque: so far as international law is concerned, unjust warriors
still aren’t strongly permitted to fight. But this underplays the role of
the state in completing a normative picture only partially sketched out
by international law.13 One way to explain this is by argument from histor-
ical and institutional depth. International law emerged in and through
the modern, sovereign state. But while it curbed some of the early mod-
ern state’s rights, it hasn’t eclipsed the state entirely as a source of legal
obligations. And where international law hasn’t specifically prohibited
the exercise of other powers and privileges, theymay be presumed to con-
tinue.14 So, just as the essentials of modern jus in bello were composed
on the basis of established customs of war at an earlier stage than the
highly restrictive contemporary jus ad bellum, the soldier’s obligation to
serve the sovereign state preceded the creation of the legal jus in bello.
As such, it is as much a part of the customs of war as anything else. As
Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro put it, “The soldier’s license to kill
is an ancient right. Indeed, it is of such antiquity that it is almost impos-
sible to find an explicit statement of it before Grotius. . . . What in ordinary
life was murder for which he could be tried and hung was now simply the
performance of his soldierly duty—one for which he was immune regard-
less of whether the war in which he fought was just. As long as he followed
the rules.”15 The war privilege, on this description, combines two inci-
dents, an immunity and a duty. As such, as Gary Solis writes, “The combat-
13. On the relationship between international and national law, see LMW, 53.
14. This is implicit in the “Lotus principle—that states are permitted to do what inter-
national law does not prohibit [which] clearly refers to weak permissions rather than
strong permissions” (ibid., 32).
15. Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, The Internationalists and Their Plan to Outlaw
War (London: Allen Lane, 2017), 62, 77 (emphasis added). Hobbes writes, “He that
inrowleth himselfe a Souldier, or taketh imprest mony, . . . is obliged, not only to go to
the battell, but also not to run from it, without his Captaines leave.” Quoted in Luciano
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ant’s privilege has always been an important customary element of the law
of war.”16
If recruiting soldiers and imposing “soldierly duty” is customary, ac-
cepted practice for states, then it could explain why soldiers are widely
thought to have a war privilege under the LOAC: this is because the
LOAC is built around those parts of state practice that it hasn’t prohib-
ited or replaced. If the practice hasn’t been prohibited, then it is implic-
itly permitted under international law. The net result is that even if it
is true that the international LOAC doesn’t strongly permit unjust war-
riors to kill directly, it cannot be denied that unjust warriors are strongly
permitted to kill under the law of war. This is because international
law weakly permits states to strongly permit soldiers to fight. And, in this
sense, international law does permit unjust warriors in a strong sense to
fight indirectly (see LMW, 33–34).
Let me consider some objections to this view:
Objection 1.—First, the weak permission that sovereign states enjoy
differs in one crucial respect from the one Haque attributes to unjust
warriors. Whereas states are not prohibited from enlisting their citizens,
persons in government are not immune from prosecution under inter-
national law for fighting unjust wars. It might therefore be objected that
the “crime of aggression” includes levying soldiers for the purposes of
unjust war. For instance, according to the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, “‘crime of aggression’ means the planning, prep-
aration, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to ex-
ercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of
an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes
a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations” (art. 8(1)).
Conscription of additional forces might be construed as part of the crime
insofar as it is “preparation” for aggressive war, or part of its “execution” if
reinforcing an army fighting one.
However, it is also true that while international law prohibits states
from initiating aggressive wars, it does not prohibit them from maintain-
ing regular armed forces in peacetime. And when they do so, they per-
missibly place soldiers under a legal obligation to serve in combat later.
The basic principle, therefore, still stands: governments are prohibited
from exploiting their armed forces for aggressive purposes, but they re-
tain the ability to privilege soldiers even when it’s in violation of the legal
jus ad bellum. This they do by (1) exercising their power to obligate sol-
diers to obey orders that are lawful under the LOAC and (2) creating a
de facto state of belligerence by declaration or action. These are the
Venezia, Hobbes on Legal Authority and Political Obligation (Houndsmills, UK: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2015), 118.
16. Solis, Law of Armed Conflict, 41–42 (emphasis added).
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components of what I have elsewhere called the “Lesser Authority” of
the state: its ability to create a legal state of war and the jural relations
that constitute it with or without just cause. Whereas “Legitimate Author-
ity”may be required for just war, Lesser Authority is seen in sharper relief
when it is exercised by initiating unjust war (where there are no substan-
tive moral grounds for the rights claimed by its combatants).17
Objection 2.—Another objection might cite conscientious objection
and human rights. If individuals have a right protected by IHR laws to
refuse service in wars they believe to be unjust, then it might contradict
the state’s right to obligate them in the same wars. One would cancel out
the other.
This is doubtful, however. Insofar as a right of conscientious objec-
tion is recognized—for instance, under the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR)18—it qualifies the duty to fight in a limited way
rather than negating it. First, the right is as an exemption from a legal ob-
ligation. Therefore, those who have not discovered reasons to doubt the
justice of their war or who have not (yet, successfully) made a case for ex-
emption are still legally obliged to obey lawful orders. Their immunity
under the LOAC continues in the meantime to be backed by a duty per-
missibly imposed under national law. Second, crucially, whereas the right
to object to armed conflict in general is thought to be a proper applica-
tion of freedom of conscience, a right of “selective conscientious objec-
tion” is rarely recognized. In a recent British case, for instance, where
the appellant cited concerns “confined to Afghanistan rather than mili-
tary conflict in general,” it weakened his case because, as Rosalind En-
glish writes, it “put him in the position of a political, rather than conscien-
tious—or moral—opponent of the system which he was resisting.” Such
a claim was unlikely to benefit from case law surrounding ECHR arti-
cle 9.19 Objectors are more likely to be recognized when they oppose
war per se rather than one particular war. And even states recognizing
17. See Christopher Finlay, “Legitimate and Non-state Political Violence,” Journal of
Political Philosophy 18 (2010): 287–312, 301–2; and Terrorism and the Right to Resist: A Theory
of Just Revolutionary War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), chap. 6. On “le-
gitimate authority” as a “permissive” criterion, see Jonathan Parry, “Legitimate Authority
and the Ethics of War: A Map of the Terrain,” Ethics and International Affairs 31 (2017):
169–89.
18. According to the “Guide on Article 9 of the ECHR” (updated May 2018), the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights “has ruled that the safeguards of Article 9 apply, in princi-
ple, to opposition to military service, when it is motivated by a serious, insuperable conflict
between compulsory service in the army and an individual’s conscience or his or her sin-
cere and deeply-held religious or other convictions” (sec. 2, para. 58); https://www.echr
.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_9_ENG.pdf.
19. See Rosalind English, “The Limits of Conscientious Objection,” Guardian, Decem-
ber 13, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/dec/13/conscientious-objection
-soldier-afghanistan.
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selective objection limit it to conscripts and exclude professional soldiers
(e.g., Australia).20
Conscientious objection draws attention to an important additional
point about punishment and permissibility. As Haque emphasizes, (un-
just) combatants are immune from punishment by foreign states for law-
ful acts in wartime. This points to the weak permissibility of those acts
under international law. But it’s also generally true that (unjust) combat-
ants are liable to punishment by their own states if they fail to commit law-
ful acts of violence when ordered to do so. Immunity from punishment
doesn’t necessarily indicate a strong legal permission, as Haque says,
but legal liability to punishment does reflect the existence of a legal
duty—and a legal duty implies a strong permission to perform that duty.21
Objection 3.—The objection here is the suggestion that early modern
interpreters of the customary law of nations agree with Haque’s analysis.
If successful, it could raise doubts about my claim that soldiers have gen-
erally been granted belligerent rights within the wider architecture of
the law of war. Haque, for instance, cites a passage from Emer de Vattel
in support of treating the permissions bestowed on unjust combatants as
mere immunities, not justifications (LMW, 26).
I think, however, that Haque and the early modern theorists are
making different claims. Haque distinguishes between two sorts of legal
right, strong and weak. But Grotius, for instance, follows Cicero in dis-
tinguishing law (“the standard of what is permissible (licere)” and “not li-
able to punishment”) from morality (“the standard of right ( fas esse)”
which is ascribed “to nature”).22 Grotius directly contrasts lawlike moral
principles which cannot, for various reasons, be positivized in interna-
tional law with principles that can be. So his distinction seems closer to
McMahan’s juxtaposition of “deep morality” to the “law of war” than to
Haque’s contrast between two types of legal permission. What Grotius
sought to emphasize was that laws permit fighting but don’t negate un-
just warriors’ underlying culpability from a purely natural, moral point
of view.23
20. United Nations publications: Conscientious Objection to Military Service (New York:
United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, 2012), 58, http://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ConscientiousObjection_en.pdf. Hugo Grotius
is the only significant early modern natural law theorist to recognize limited cases of selec-
tive conscientious objection; see Leroy Walters, “A Historical Perspective on Selective Con-
scientious Objection,” in War in the Twentieth Century: Sources in Theological Ethics, ed. Rich-
ard B. Miller (Louisville, KY: Westminster/Knox, 2004), 224.
21. For relevant codes in the United Kingdom, see the Army Act (1955) and the
Armed Forces Act (2006), sec. 12.
22. Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, trans. Francis Kelsey (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1925), 642–43.
23. See ibid., 644, on the impossibility of “decid[ing] regarding the justice of a war
between two peoples” and, hence, the moral status of opposing combatants.
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The passage that Haque cites from Vattel reflects a similar analysis
of the relationship between the law of nature and the law of nations to
Grotius’s. The symmetrical permissions afforded to opponents fighting
under the “voluntary law of nations” do not render the acts of an unjust
side morally righteous: the legal permission “does not, to him who takes up
arms in an unjust cause, give any real right that is capable of justifying his con-
duct and acquitting his conscience, but merely entitles him to the benefit of the ex-
ternal effects of the law, and to impunity among mankind.”24 As with Grotius,
Vattel’s point speaks to a distinction between natural morality and posi-
tive law rather than to Haque’s distinction between two possibilities of
construing positive law. But additionally, Vattel’s point is directed not at
combatants but at sovereigns. He continues, two sentences later, “The
sovereign, therefore, whose arms are not sanctioned by justice, is not
the less unjust, or less guilty of violating the sacred law of nature, al-
though that law itself (with a view to avoid aggravating the evils of human
society by an attempt to prevent them) requires that he be allowed to
enjoy the same external rights as justly belong to his enemy.”25 By con-
trast, the effects of natural and voluntary law on combatants in unjust
wars are quite different owing to their political obligations and the legally
binding duty of subjects enlisted for military service. “No person,” Vattel
writes, “is naturally exempt from taking up arms in defence of the state, -
the obligation of every member of society being the same. Those alone
are exempted, who are incapable of carrying arms, or supporting the fa-
tigues of war.”26 He rejects vehemently the right claimed by ecclesiastics
to exemption from military service.27 Once enlisted—whether volun-
tarily or by conscription—the soldier “is to take an oath to serve faithfully,
and not desert the service. This is no more than what they are already
obliged to . . . as subjects.”28
Most importantly, Vattel rejects selective conscientious objection
too. Once war is declared, neither the private citizen facing conscription
nor the serving soldier can refuse to fight, regardless of their opinions:
On all occasions susceptible of doubt, the whole nation, the individ-
uals, and especially the military, are to submit their judgement to
those who hold the reins of government, - to the sovereign: this they
are bound to do, by the essential principles of political society and
of government. What would be the consequence, if, at every step of
the sovereign, the subjects were at liberty to weigh the justice of his
24. Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, ed. Béla Kaposy and Richard Whatmore (Indi-
anapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008), 592; LMW, 26.
25. Vattel, Law of Nations, 592.
26. Ibid., 472–74.
27. Ibid., 474–75.
28. Ibid., 479.
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reasons, and refuse to march to a war which might to them appear
unjust? It often happens that prudence will not permit a sovereign
to disclose all his reasons. It is the duty of subjects to suppose them
just and wise, until clear and absolute evidence tells them the con-
trary.
Such conclusive proof, Vattel thinks, is “nearly impossible” even post
bellum. But even if it was discovered, combatants are “innocent” of wrong-
doing and the crime is wholly the sovereign’s. The only duty arising for
combatants is to return anything they had acquired personally during
the war.29
Vattel’s analysis of the “voluntary law of nations” therefore supports
the claim that combatants enjoy not only immunity but also a positive
privilege to fight grounded in national sovereignty and law even in un-
just wars.
Objection 4.—Couldn’t unjust warriors have conflicting obligations
between a national-law duty to fight and a duty under the international-
law jus ad bellum to object? And, if so, wouldn’t the latter trump the for-
mer?
One way to resolve an ostensible conflict could be for the service
conception of legitimate authority to adjudicate between them. Soldiers
should obey the state when deferring to its authority appears to be the
most reliable way to satisfy their basic duties. But if the state appears un-
reliable, they should object. Haque writes, for instance, that “soldiers
should not defer to their superiors if ordered to commit acts that are
clearly immoral, or if important new information or circumstances arise
that their superiors did not anticipate, or if they know that their superi-
ors issued their orders arbitrarily or in bad faith” (LMW, 54). If Haque’s
comment refers only to orders concerning conduct in bello, then it seems
right. It is consistent with the service approach to the LOAC: if the law has
authority in the relevant sense, then the point is that soldiers shouldn’t
second-guess its applicability to particular cases. But if he meant this com-
ment to encompass the compatibility between state orders (general or par-
ticular) and the jus ad bellum, then things are more complicated.
From the perspective of just war theory, certainly, revisionists would
agree that soldiers doubtful about a war ought not to fight. But it is less
clear that the law requires it. If such a legal duty exists, then it could be
either national or international in source. It’s highly doubtful that it
could be national: it would be surprising to find many cases where do-
mestic law obliged soldiers to resist orders by their own government to
serve in unjust wars. But it is also doubtful that such an obligation exists
29. Ibid., 588. For arguments along similar lines to Vattel’s, both earlier and later, see
Christopher Finlay, “Bastards, Brothers, and Unjust Warriors: Ethics and Enmity in Just
War Cinema,” Review of International Studies 43 (2017): 73–94, 82–83.
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in international law. There is nothing in the LOAC to suggest that sol-
diers are obliged to refuse to fight in what they believe to be unjust wars,
provided that they are not ordered to employ unlawful methods. And
the legal chief source of jus ad bellum, the UN Charter, is addressed to
states, not individuals.
National law and international law therefore seem to be partly
aligned and yet partly in tension. They are aligned insofar as national
law renders combat by soldiers strongly permissible legally once they
have enlisted and received orders. This fills out the permissive lacuna
in the LOAC, complementing its prohibitive clauses. But they are in ten-
sion insofar as the legal permission (duty) that the state can impose on
soldiers is at odds with its duty under the UN Charter not to prosecute
nondefensive wars. And yet, in spite of violating moral duties by fighting
in unjust wars (ad bellum), soldiers have no legal obligation to refuse. The
law provides no direct guidance in such cases, and so soldiers wishing to
avoid committing such serious wrongs must fall back on the resources of
moral argument stemming directly from just war theory.
* * *
Haque writes that the LOAC “is prohibitive, not permissive, and ap-
plies alongside other applicable moral and legal norms” (LMW, 55). The
most important are IHR laws and, presumably, the moral and legal jus ad
bellum. However, the authority of the state as a source of law is an impor-
tant part of the picture too. And since this authority predated the LOAC
historically, it is unsurprising that the devisers of international law have
seen no reason to add anything specifically to permit soldiers to fight.
The necessary permissions have existed for much longer than the LOAC
has. There is something to be said, therefore, for differentiating between
the international LOAC as such and the law of war more widely: the lat-
ter consists of both international law and the customs and laws of war at
the level of the state.30 So McMahan’s dichotomy between the morality
and the law of war still captures the right normative contrast.
With regard to tensions between deep morality and law, Seth Lazar
has argued that a positive permission to fight is unnecessary for the pur-
poses of the humanitarian view on combatant equality: only immunity is
needed to incentivize restraint by unjust warriors.31 I agree. But on the
basis of the argument of this section, I disagree with Haque’s reply that
no legal amendment is needed to achieve this position (LMW, 25). Elim-
inating the permission to fight would require international law to re-
move the state’s power to place soldiers under a legal obligation to fight.
30. The US Department of Defense Law of War Manual, 8, para. 1.3.1.2, defines “law of
war” (and LOAC) as wider in sense than IHL. On my suggestion, “law of war” has a wider
sense even than LOAC/IHL.
31. See Seth Lazar, “The Morality and Law of War,” in Routledge Companion to the Phi-
losophy of Law, ed. Andrei Marmor (London: Routledge, 2012), 376.
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On my interpretation, without such an innovation, the tension between
morality and law is even greater than revisionist philosophers suggest:
the soldier is generally caught between two opposing duties (to obey
and fight; not to fight) rather than between a permission (to fight) and
a duty (not to fight).
III. NONSTATE-ON-STATE WARS: KILLING WITHOUT A LICENSE
So states are permitted (i.e., not prohibited) under international law to
recruit soldiers and organize armies. The importance of this feature of
state authority in legitimizing regular soldiers is thrown into relief by
cases where war is notmorally justified. The state identifies them as “com-
batants” and exercises a Hohfeldian power to equip them with the nor-
mative incidents customarily identified with the role: privileges, liberties,
claims, and (partly through international law) immunities.32 This power
is what renders their actions a form of “legitimate violence.”33
In combination with the LOAC, state-derived legitimacy puts indi-
vidual soldiers in a comparatively confident position as regards norma-
tive guidance in their relations with enemies. But what about those fight-
ing for nonstate forces? Wars involving nonstate parties have become
increasingly frequent. In fact, as Sandesh Sivakumaran remarks, “The
vast majority of armed conflicts that are fought today are not of an inter-
national character.”34 In principle, this statement should exclude civil
wars between nonstate sides and imperial colonists, alien occupiers, or
racist regimes, which are defined as “international” under Additional
Protocol 1 (1977), article 1(4). But, as Sivakumaran says, “not a single
state has acknowledged, nor will they acknowledge, being involved in
a war of national liberation since that would be tantamount to accepting
that they were colonial powers, alien occupiers, or racist regimes.”35
International status is therefore likely to be contested, and nonstate
forces of all kinds can expect to be regarded, at best, as participants in
noninternational armed conflict and, at worst, as “terrorist” criminals.
32. Soldiers are immune from prosecution in their home state, too, for lawful warfare.
As Haque argues, this isn’t the result of the LOAC. Presumably it is therefore a matter of
national law.
33. Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures, trans. Rodney Livingstone, ed. David Owen and
Tracy B. Strong (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004), 33.
34. Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-international Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), 1; Pablo Kalmanovitz, “Sovereignty, Pluralism, and Regular War:
Wolff and Vattel’s Enlightenment Critique of Just War,” Political Theory 46 (2018): 218–
41, 233.
35. Sivakumaran, Law of Non-international Armed Conflict, 220; Noelle Higgins, “The
Regulation of Armed Non-state Actors: Promoting the Application of the Laws of War to
Conflicts Involving National Liberation Movements,” Human Rights Brief 17 (2009): 12–
18, 16.
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Similar problems are therefore likely to arise for nonstate forces (hence-
forth “rebels”) fighting against state soldiers in all such cases. They face
at least two difficulties. First, even if they have a strong moral justification
for fighting from a just war perspective, they cannot rely on the legal pro-
tections and permissions that the law of war grants regular combatants.
Even in the best case, whereas international law grants at least weak per-
missions and protections to soldiers serving in unjust wars on behalf of
states, it grants no such immunities to rebels in noninternational armed
conflicts (LMW, 6 n. 5, 26 n. 27; see also 7). The lack of both (1) the
(weak) permission granted in the LOAC and (2) a strong permission
(duty) issuing from a state leaves rebels with an unmodified prohibition
in national law, at home and abroad, against all killing. They can there-
fore be prosecuted by their own state or by others even for morally jus-
tified, discriminate acts of war.
For the rebel, therefore, far from distinguishing clearly between
permissible and impermissible actions, the law of war presents only a
field of prohibitions. It might be replied that the LOAC still gives gen-
eral guidance insofar as rebels might choose to commit only those ac-
tions that would be permissible for state soldiers. But even this sort of
indirect effect is vitiated by a second difficulty, which is that, before reach-
ing to the LOAC for guidance, the rebel first needs a judgment about the
political context in which she operates. For state forces, the legal condi-
tion of war ( just or unjust) begins as soon as a state declares it, and so
do the permissions it entails. But the rebel has no state to rely on to exer-
cise this power. She must therefore call on other sources of guidance to
determine whether she is operating in conditions that morally justify
claiming those permissions. Her jural relations with opposing soldiers de-
pend on the answer to one ostensibly simple question: is she engaged in a
( just) “war”? If she belongs to a side that satisfies conditions necessary to
justify morally the range of actions permitted by the LOAC to regular sol-
diers, then she can claim the bundle of normative incidents identified
with “combatant” status; if not, then she can’t.
Let’s test this: imagine it is Syria in March 2011, and peaceful pro-
tests face violence from state forces. While many flee, some stand their
ground and engage the soldiers. Peaceful resistance becomes incipient
armed rebellion with fighters initially operating on their own initiative
or in small, relatively uncoordinated groups. Someone joining the fight
accepts Haque’s advice to do only those things not prohibited by the
LOAC. Will this provide her with sufficient guidance to give the law le-
gitimate authority over her actions?
I will suggest in Section IV that even the prohibitions of the LOAC
may be hard to translate for these purposes. But let’s assume for the sake
of argument that they are clear. This would still leave the rebel wonder-
ing what she is permitted to do. If she is engaged in an “armed conflict”
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or “war” in one sense or another, then she might interpret the law’s guid-
ance on things like proportionality and distinction as implicitly permis-
sive, just as a regular combatant might. So she might do a variety of
things that would exceed the right of self- and other-defense as it is com-
monly framed in peacetime domestic, criminal law. She wouldn’t await
attack before attacking but could rather designate themembers of oppos-
ing forces “enemy combatants” and seek them out for military engage-
ment regardless of whether they pose an immediate threat to anyone.
In doing so, she could sometimes proceed even if civilians are likely to
be harmed, provided that harms aren’t disproportionate to her “military”
objective, and so on. But in what circumstances—at what point in the de-
velopment of de facto fighting from uncoordinated skirmishes to fully
fledged rebellion—may she assume that these actions are permissible?
Outside a state of war, violence is often thought to be justified against
only imminent or ongoing attack. But exceptions are possible that sug-
gest that the imminence condition is more of a rule of thumb than an
essential precondition.36 It commonly serves as such because cases satis-
fying the imminence condition are also likely to satisfy deeper conditions
for justified defensive killing. According to a leading family of accounts,
defensive killing can be justified in two ways, one based on liability, the
other as a lesser evil. In cases of the first kind, killing is justified if, first,
the target is responsible for the threat defended against in a way that ren-
ders them liable to be killed and, second, killing is instrumental in de-
grading or defeating it.37 In cases of lesser evil justification, the target con-
ceivably might not be liable to any harm, or might be liable to a degree of
harm less serious than killing. Either way, killing could be justified only if
it was necessary as a lesser evil than not resisting the threat it helps defeat.
Where the target is liable to some lesser quantity of harm, then the harm
it is necessary to inflict defensively in excess of that quantity must be a les-
ser evil compared with the evil defended against.38
If these are the underlying conditions for justified defensive killing,
then individuals acting in an uncoordinated way against enemy forces or-
ganized on a national scale are likely to have problems justifying some
kinds of offensive force that the LOACpermits to their opponents. There
are at least three potentially problematic types of cases. The first is where
enemy combatants are not currently threatening anyone but might do so
36. Rodin, War and Self-Defense, 41, interprets the imminence condition as internal to
the right of self-defense. For hypothetical exceptions, see Jeff McMahan, “War as Self-
Defence,” Ethics and International Affairs 18 (2004): 75–80, 76.
37. See, e.g., Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Clarendon, 2009); and Frowe, De-
fensive Killing. McMahan sees instrumentality as internal to liability (Killing in War, 8).
38. Jeff McMahan, “What Rights May Be Defended by Means of War?,” in The Morality
of Defensive War, ed. Cécile Fabre and Seth Lazar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014),
133–35.
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in the future. A second type occurs where many individual combatants
contribute to a large-scale, collectively organized threat in ways that are
relatively small or indirect and which are hard to evaluate, both for the
agents themselves and for others observing them. As Victor Tadros writes,
“Combatants in the sameunit as the combatants who directly pose threats
support their missions with navigational and tactical advice, they encour-
age combatants to pose these threats, they help to load weapons and
identify targets, and so on. Combatants beyond the unit also contrib-
ute—without them the war would not have occurred, they secure the ter-
ritory from which further advances can be made, they divert threats away
from the unit, they provide intelligence, they provide a disciplinary hier-
archy which makes the war machine more effective, and so on.”39 A third
type is that of overdetermination, where each combatant is likely to be
replaced swiftly by another held in reserve if eliminated. These cases
all fall within the range of legitimate targets defined by the LOAC, so
state forces may regard them as unproblematic. But the factors defining
them can affect the ability of rebels to justify attack.
In the absence of a strong legal permission backed by state author-
ity, the rebel only has moral argument to rely on to justify attacking these
types of targets. But it is doubtful that targets in the first type of case can
be regarded as liable to harm based on moral responsibility for a wrong-
ful threat since they currently pose none. If rebels attack, it will be be-
cause of what their uniforms indicate they might do rather than for any-
thing they are actively doing. In the second and third cases, individual
moral liability to defensive killing may be hard for rebels to judge, and
the relatively marginal or indirect ways in which some individuals are
linked to coordinated threats might also entail lower degrees of moral
responsibility and, hence, liability. This is likely to mean that permissions
to kill frequently lean more heavily on a combined justification, taking
account of both liability and lesser evil. So, for instance, in the second
case, some targets might not be individually liable to suffer harms as se-
vere as being killed, but killing them as a necessary part of a strategy for
defeating their side as a whole might nevertheless be less bad than let-
ting their side kill other, entirely innocent people.40 In the third case,
overdetermination might not necessarily diminish individual liability,
but just like in cases of the second kind, the ability to justify killing
one person depends on the ability to kill (and to justify killing) a much
larger number of individuals. This is because eliminating only one or a
small number of participants will typically do little or nothing to degrade
39. Victor Tadros, “Causal Contributions and Liability,” Ethics 128 (2018): 402–31,
402–3.
40. See Saba Bazargan, “Killing Minimally Responsible Threats,” Ethics 125 (2014):
114–36.
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the threat they contribute to. Defeating the threat requires eliminating a
large number. Killing will therefore be instrumental in defeating it only
if it is part of a larger-scale, coordinated strategy.41
A rebel knowingly acting in concert with large numbers of fellow
fighters, all coordinated strategically by leaders capable of directing
them, might therefore be able to justify a wider range of attacks approx-
imating to those permitted by the LOAC to state forces. But if she lacks
grounds for believing that her fighting contributes to a wider war in this
sense, just as our Syrian rebel might early in the revolt, she will be limited
to fighting within a somewhat narrower range of possible cases. Rather
than simply following the contours of the laws of war, she is bound to rely
more directly on sublegal moral intuitions, principles, and judgments
for guidance and adopt a more restrictive approach to violence.
So, the LOACmight guide nonstate actors if we agree that it applies
permissively as well as prohibitively. But it provides that service only un-
der certain objective conditions, and it is necessary to judge whether
they obtain before claiming for rebels the permissions that the law grants
to state combatants. Judgments are likely to be contested. As David Ar-
mitage writes, when it comes to specifying the status of internal conflicts,
“attempts at precision are as doomed as they are illusory for the simple
reason that civil war is an essentially contested concept. . . . Being precise,
in the sense of using clear definitions, turns out to be inescapably polit-
ical. The elements of those definitions as much as their application are
always matters for principled dispute. This seems to be especially true of
civil war—an essentially contested concept about the elements of contes-
tation.”42 Quite how—or indeed whether—this problem might be reme-
died through law is hard to see. But unless it can, the moral reasoning
characteristic of just war theory will have an independent role to play,
providing would-be combatants with guidance in making the moral and
political judgments that logically precede a moral claim to belligerent
status. The ability of rebels (and third parties judging them) to apply
the LOAC in the service of morals is itself dependent on this prior anal-
ysis, because without it they have no basis on which to claim that its per-
missions cover their actions.
IV. IDENTIFYING LEGITIMATE TARGETS: STATE
ON NONSTATE, NONSTATE ON STATE
So far, I have argued that combatants depend on normative sources ad-
ditional to the LOAC itself in order to justify being guided by it. I now
41. See Tadros, “Causal Contributions,” 422, 430.
42. David Armitage, Civil War: A History in Ideas (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2017), 226.
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want to argue that the content of the LOAC isn’t always the best guide
for combatants seeking to discharge their most important moral duties.
There may sometimes be grounds to question its central prohibition.
The LOAC is built around a principle according to which enemy
combatants are legitimate targets for intentional attack while noncom-
batants are immune. Haque’s argument that combatants should always
adhere to NCI is supported by a service view of law’s legitimate author-
ity: they should always prefer the law in cases where it conflicts with “their
own moral judgement” provided that in doing so “combatants will better
conform to the moral reasons that apply to them” (LMW, 45–46). These
moral reasons have to do with avoiding intentional or disproportionate
harm to those with the strongest moral claim to immunity: “The point of
relying on IHL is to allow combatants to bypass individualized assess-
ments of intrinsically morally relevant facts when the moral stakes are
high but directly relevant evidence is weak. . . . Combatants should not
trust the reasonableness of their beliefs regarding the moral liability of
civilians, which are susceptible to distortion by non-rational factors.
Combatants would better avoid killing morally protected civilians by fol-
lowing IHL than by following their own judgement” (LMW, 47). I argue
(Secs. IV.A and IV.B) that this analysis depends on a false binary. Be-
tween following NCI and following one’s own case-by-case judgments lies
the further possibility of following a bespoke, context-specific rule under
the guidance of authoritative leadership. In some cases, I maintain, this
rule might help combatants conform better to moral reasons applying to
them as regards targets. Moreover, as I argue in Section IV.C, it may also
help them conform better to moral reasons arising from the ends of just
war. If the former argument is true, the service view overestimates the
risks of deviating from NCI. On the latter argument, it underestimates
the risks of always adhering to it.
A. NCI and Alternative Rules
Three thoughts point toward probable exceptions to the legal principle
of NCI. The first is that there is a more credible rival to following NCI
than making individually focused, case-by-case judgments about moral
liability.43 NCI serves its purposes if it permits opposing forces to target
those whose elimination is likely to be effective in defeating a threat
and who are likely to be morally responsible for it, while avoiding the ep-
istemic risks of having to judge each individual case on its own particular
43. According to Jonathan Parry and Daniel Viehoff (“Instrumental Authority and Its
Challenges: The Case of the Laws of War,” in this issue), Haque’s binary reflects a “narrow”
instrumentalist approach to the LOAC’s authority. They defend a “wide” account that
would permit individuals to defer to a third source of guidance that offered better pros-
pects than deferring to the LOAC. In this regard, their argument runs in parallel with
mine, although the alternatives we consider differ.
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merits. But it is surely possible that, in some cases, an alternative, be-
spoke rule could serve the same purposes by specifying a different cate-
gory of legitimate targets based on the same deeper criteria. If the rule
satisfied conditions of epistemic and substantive justification better than
individuated judgments, then it might satisfy the service-based require-
ments that, according to Haque, favor NCI: to help soldiers conform
“better . . . to their moral obligations indirectly—by following the [alter-
native rule]—than directly—by attempting to apply deep moral princi-
ples under adverse conditions” (LMW, 135).
As a partial support for this idea, the second thought is that some-
times there are reasons to doubt that following NCI as the enemy defines
it is justified. Just war theorists have spent relatively little time on the nor-
mative issues raised by the different ways in which belligerents specify the
content of their own combatant and noncombatant categories. These in-
clude the question of how many combatants to recruit, by what means
(e.g., voluntary or coercive), and how (far) to distance them physically
and distinguish them visually from noncombatants.44 There can be vari-
ous problems with a belligerent’s decisions. For one, they might violate
principles of domestic justice. If combatants are known to have been
duped and coerced, it diminishes (even if it doesn’t wholly eliminate)
the weight that the principle of combatant liability ought to be given.45
Similarly, it is also likely that the weight given to NCI could be dimin-
ished by the knowledge that, at the same time, those with greatest agency
in causing wrongful threats had manipulated it in order to claim protec-
tion. These considerations might not often negate the salience of NCI
entirely, but they could contribute to the effect of other factors.
A second problem is when belligerents fail to signal the distinction
clearly. Deploying nonuniformed guerrillas among civilians can pose
this difficulty. A state might try to fight them discriminately by using
functional criteria to interpret NCI—treating those performing combat
functions as liable to attack—though it may be impossible to do so con-
fidently.46 A third problem arises if the enemy belligerent hasn’t, in fact,
made a functional division. Combatant/noncombatant distinction relies
on a division of labor creating two mutually exclusive categories, but
sometimes combatant responsibilities are widely distributed, encompass-
ing civilians. This is a feature, for instance, of cyber warfare and drone
warfare: of the latter, Laura Dickinson writes, “Each twenty-four-hour
combat air patrol of the US armed Predator and Reaper drones . . . re-
44. Christopher Finlay, “Fairness and Liability in the Just War: Combatants, Non-
combatants, and Lawful Irregulars,” Political Studies 61 (2013): 142–60.
45. See McMahan, Killing in War, sec. 4.1, on liability and the effects of ignorance and
duress as excuses.
46. See Jens David Ohlin, “The Combatant’s Privilege in Asymmetric and Covert Con-
flicts,” Yale Journal of International Law 40 (2015): 337–93, 346.
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quires at least 350 people, many of whom are contractors.”47 Or individ-
uals might step in and out of the combatant role intermittently, for ex-
ample, when drone operators living far from the theater of war “kill in
the morning and enjoy dinner with their children later in the evening.”48
A fourth way of rendering NCI problematic occurs when there is an
ostensible distinction, but it is doubtful that it tracks underlying moral
criteria of liability to attack, which point toward a different distinction.
A belligerent might gerrymander NCI by identifying some military func-
tions as “civilian” and claiming immunity for them. Nonstate groups
might do so by distinguishing “political” and “military” wings. In North-
ern Ireland, for instance, Sinn Féin’s claim to be a separate organization
from the Provisional IRA was persistently challenged by claims that “po-
litical” figures like Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams were paramili-
tary commanders.49 A state might do so by using civilian contractors to
perform de facto military functions without redesignating them. In re-
cent decades, states have increasingly outsourced functions previously
carried out by armed forces to private contractors: in Afghanistan and
Iraq, contractors employed by the United States sometimes exceeded
the number of military personnel and at one point reached 260,000.50
In the absence of formal designation as “combatants,” the question
whether they are liable to attack under the LOAC depends on whether
particular individuals are taking “direct part in hostilities.” But precisely
how to define participation legally is contested: some restrict it to direct
acts of violence, but others think that the range encompasses activities
like loading aircraft with bombs, “providing co-ordinates for an attack,”
“acting as guards or intelligence agents,” “providing logistical support,”
and others.51 Alongside the growth in cyberwar, drones, and automated
47. Massimo Durante, “Violence, Just Cyber War, and Information,” Philosophy and
Technology 28 (2015): 369–85, 374; Laura Dickinson, “Drones, Automated Weapons, and
Private Military Contractors,” in New Technologies for Human Rights Law and Practice, ed.
Molly K. Land and Jay D. Aronson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 95,
100. On problems assigning responsibility for war crimes involving private parties, see
Dickinson, “Drones,” 117–22.
48. Aroop Mukharji, “Drone Operators: Soldiers or Civilians?,” Atlantic, March 28,
2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/drone-operators-sol
diers-or-civilians/274447/.
49. MI5 reports that Sinn Féin and the IRA remain subject to unified direction by the
Provisional Army Council; “Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland,” 4, https://assets
.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/469548/Paramilitary_Groups_in_Northern_Ireland_-_20_Oct_2015.pdf.
50. Dickinson, “Drones,” 95. Haque suggests legitimate ways of assigning “service and
support functions” that don’t entail moral liability to attack to “civilian employees” (LMW,
88).
51. Louise Doswald-Beck, “Private Military Companies under International Humani-
tarian Law,” in FromMercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 128.
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weapons, the use of private contractors exacerbates moral and legal am-
biguity surrounding responsibility and liability.52 The opportunities for
belligerents to organize their forces in such a way as to render fighting
by the standards of the LOAC difficult for their enemies are therefore
likely to increase.53
If these examples show how de facto combatants might be con-
cealed by redesignation or by nontheater deployments, others point to-
ward wider distributions of moral liability among civilians. Revisionists
frequently highlight the contributions that civilians can make to injus-
tices, including international aggression, arguing that even when differ-
ent in kind from military contributions, they can have comparable moral
significance.54 An important change in both theory and practice that
reinforces this possibility is the shift from viewing national defense as
paradigmatic of just war to focusing increasingly on humanitarian de-
fense of individuals from basic rights violations. Where just cause for
war is defined by international aggression, it is plausible to think that
combatants will be the chief perpetrators. But the kind of violence that
justifies intervention frequently relies onmore direct contributions from
civilians.
Consider, for instance, the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Tutsis were
killed by Hutu soldiers acting alongside civilian militias. But in addition,
killers used census and travel data supplied by the government to locate
victims. This establishes a clear causal contribution and, on the assump-
tion that the officials who assisted knew or had reason to suspect what
they were contributing to, moral complicity. Higher concentrations of
killings in Rwanda compared with Darfur have been attributed specifi-
cally to this information supply.55 Given these facts, it is surely conceiv-
able that targeting some individuals from the relevant departments,
along with town mayors, prefects, and others who helped coordinate
the massacre, could have been morally discriminate. And because the
scale of killing in Rwanda depended directly on their contributions, it
is also conceivable that it could have affected outcomes.
Whether targeting individuals other than direct perpetrators of
physical violence is necessary for success depends on, among other
things, the nature of the military forces available. A UN task force might
not need to resort to such measures. But, by contrast, rebels defending
the victims from within the state might. Nonstate forces sometimes have
52. Dickinson, “Drones,” 95, emphasizes the combined effects of these developments.
53. See Michael Gross, Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination, and Black-
mail in an Age of Asymmetric Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
54. See, e.g., Frowe, Defensive Killing, chap. 6.
55. Donald Bloxham, “Organized Mass Murder: Structure, Participation, and Motiva-
tion in Comparative Perspective,”Holocaust and Genocide Studies 22 (2008): 203–45, 223–24.
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to consider different strategic alternatives from those available to state
forces when faced with regime violence.56
The paradigm case of this kind, of course, is that of German rule in
Europe during World War II. In France, for instance, occupiers relied
heavily on the French civil service, not only for routine management
but also for repression and genocide. As Mark Mazower writes, “Bureau-
crats [served] as instruments of repression, notably in round-ups of Jews
and political opponents.”57 Just as in Rwanda, civilian participation was
directly causal in determining scale. Without the collaboration of the
French police, for instance, “targeted mass deportations were virtually
impossible to achieve.”58 In light of this, it is unsurprising that armed re-
sistance took aim not only at soldiers but also at judicial, administrative,
and police targets. Olivier Wieviorka, for instance, recounts a series of
assassinations in 1943 and 1944 encompassing directors in the German
employment office, an SS General, a public prosecutor who had sought
the death penalty against a resister, and a police superintendent.59 This
list clearly disregardsNCI, strictly speaking, but in a context where wrong-
ful violence was coordinated and executed by professional groups falling
well outside the category of combatants, it doesn’t necessarily appear un-
principled. Some of these actions might not have been morally justified.
Nonetheless, each seems like a prima facie justifiable type of case.
A variety of factors might therefore diminish the weight that official
designations of combatant and noncombatant should be given in delib-
erating about how to fight. In fact, if attacking targets engaged in the
sorts of human rights–violating projects indicated above is necessary to
mitigate their results, failing to do so might even be wrongful, as I’ll ar-
gue in Section IV.C. The third thought, then, is that, in certain circum-
stances, it might be necessary for a belligerent resisting a large-scale
threat to basic rights to devise a targeting rule that deviates from NCI
and to instruct its combatants to follow it. The alternative principle of
discrimination would specify categories of enemy citizen—some combat-
ants, some not—that are liable to attack. They would be identified on the
basis of belonging to professions, for instance, or government depart-
ments that contribute to the wrongful violence that just war seeks to de-
feat. To avoid the moral risks of individualized, ad hoc moral judgment,
targeting should be coordinated by a rule carefully specified by the po-
litical and military leadership and justified as part of a coherent strategy
56. On pressure to do so, see Gross, Moral Dilemmas; and Fabre, Cosmopolitan War,
chaps. 4 and 7.
57. Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (London: Penguin,
2009), 433–34.
58. Ibid., 438.
59. Olivier Wieviorka, The French Resistance, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Cambridge, MA:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), 308.
Finlay Justification and Legitimacy at War 597
This content downloaded from 129.234.039.154 on June 13, 2019 06:36:22 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
for defeating the wrongful threats. Acts of resistance should be inte-
grated “into an overall military strategy” that lends legitimacy and avoids
“anarchical development,” along lines that the Free French leadership
sought to follow in World War II.60
B. Objections
Even when they follow NCI, combatants depend on their political and
military leaders for guidance on whether to fight and how. Guidance in-
cludes rules of engagement specifying how the LOAC is to be applied in
each particular conflict. The guidance offered by NCI is therefore al-
ready mediated rather than direct. So the thought that the leaders of
a just war might offer guidance with reference to a bespoke rule doesn’t
take us so far from the practices legitimized by the law of war. In light of
this, it seems less worrying than the idea of individuals judging targets
alone, case by case. I’ll offer a further argument in Section IV.C to sup-
port the claim that following a bespoke rule might, in fact, sometimes be
less morally risky than adhering to NCI. But first, let’s consider some fur-
ther objections to the idea.
Objection 1.—It might be objected, first, that noncombatants never
make nonsuperfluous contributions to military harms great enough to
render them liable to attack: “only those combatants,” Haque says, “who
pursue unjust war aims by directly, indirectly, or jointly posing unjust
threats are morally liable to defensive killing” (LMW, 90; emphasis
added). But I think that this places too much emphasis onmilitary harm-
ing. As Donald Bloxham writes of the historiography of genocide, “Our
attention is commanded by the perpetrators who we feel best embody
the overall perpetrator process—or . . . we extrapolate from characteris-
tics of the former to the latter.”61 A similar problem, I suspect, affects our
thinking about liability. If the objective of just war is to defeat a human
rights–violating regime, then it won’t chiefly be directed toward military
threats. Defense is also needed against what might be an extensive, com-
plex institutional arrangement or organization dedicated to inflicting
harms comparable to those of military violence but partly through non-
military agents.
Objection 2.—Second, even if some noncombatants are liable, it
might be objected that if combatants deviate from NCI, then innocent
people will frequently be targeted erroneously. But, by way of reply, even
if some individuals are thus objectively wronged, the fact that harm arises
from applying an alternative rule rigorously might mitigate the injus-
tice.62 Provided that the rule had legitimate authority of the sort Haque
60. Ibid., 251.
61. Bloxham, “Organized Mass Murder,” 204.
62. On judging target status and probabilities, see LMW, chap. 6.
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claims for NCI—offering combatants a better chance of responding to
moral reasons that apply to them on the whole—then following it is jus-
tifiable as the best way of respecting persons. The approach I am suggest-
ing is along the lines of what Walzer says about the “political code” that
nineteenth-century revolutionaries followed in selecting targets for assas-
sination. He maintains that it lacked the legitimacy of NCI but recognizes
that following some rule—especially one that tracks putatively significant
features of individuals’ moral performance—is less bad (epistemically if
not objectively) than following no rule.63 My argument is that sometimes
it might be objectively as well as epistemically less bad and even justifiable.
Objection 3.—A third objection might cite choice as a factor support-
ing strict adherence to NCI. If someone becomes a target for reasons
they can do nothing about, then it is worse, ceteris paribus, than if they
knowingly place themselves (or remain) in harm’s way. Civilians might
be thought to have less choice in the matter than combatants. One re-
sponse to this objection is to insist that the implementation of targeting
decisions be preceded by warnings. If members of a target category are
informed about the likelihood of attack (and its justification), it has
three morally significant effects. First, it can help dispel uncertainty in
their minds about the significance of their contributions to wrongful vi-
olence. Second, it may encourage defection, degrading the threat. And
third, it reduces the salience of choice as an objection by affording op-
portunities to reconsider.64
Objection 4.—Finally, a fourth objection is that following an alterna-
tive rule will precipitate a race to the bottom, undermining compliance
with rules as such. While I think that this may be true in some cases, it’s
not likely to be true in all cases. It is probably best to comply with NCI if
the enemy does too, even where some of the other conditions for consid-
ering an alternative are present. Otherwise, it could provoke indiscrim-
inate war by the enemy and prove self-defeating. Resorting to warfare
guided by a rule that deviates dramatically from NCI is therefore more
likely to be justifiable in cases where enemies are already unrestrained,
whether on the battlefield or in the perpetration of other crimes.
C. Not Killing Wrongfully and Other Moral Duties
I now want to argue that, in cases where following an alternative to NCI is
justifiable, it is also likely to be a duty. There is therefore an even deeper
indeterminacy regarding where the law applies: those seeking guidance
must adjudicate between the demands of the law and those of just war
theory.
63. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 197–204.
64. Finlay, Terrorism, 224–25.
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Haque’s view is premised on the assumption that just war—or, at
least, justified war—is possible, which situates it within the wider family
of just war theories. This family squabbles over many things, but it is cur-
rently unified by five assumptions underpinning the belief that in some
sense “just war” is possible. These assumptions are as follows:
1. Killing is (prima facie) wrong.
2. Letting others be killed or suffer comparable rights violations is
wrong.
3. Wrongful threats to fundamental rights are a persistent feature
of history and likely to remain so.
4. The best or only means of defeating such wrongs sometimes in-
volve killing.
5. The prima facie wrongfulness of the killing needed to defeat
such wrongs is sometimes less than that of permitting the
wrongs against others to proceed unresisted.
If you don’t accept (5), then I presume that there can be no question of
anyone justifiably killing in war. And if you disagree with (1), then you
don’t need a theory of just war. But within a just war framework, I pre-
sume that these assumptions underpin the moral commitments that a
conscientious individual needs guidance in relation to.65
If so, consider what happens in a case satisfying the conditions im-
plicit in (5). By hypothesis, then, the wrongfulness of not defending
against threats by whatever means necessary is greater than any prima fa-
cie wrongfulness attaching the killings it may require. So if someone
failed to fight when needed and able to do so, using those means neces-
sary for success, they would be guilty of a significant, net wrong. Thismust
mean that if the necessary means require fighting according to a bespoke
alternative to NCI, then doing so would be morally obligatory and refus-
ing to do so would be a greater wrong than doing so. In this case, a direct
clash between duties occurs: law (NCI) pulls one way while moral duties
arising from the jus ad bellum pull the other way.66
If this analysis is correct, then the LOAC won’t always take moral
precedence over ostensible alternatives by default. It might have done
so if normative conflicts were cashed out in terms of duties versus per-
missions. But if they arise between opposing duties, then we can’t be sure
65. For a fuller account, see Christopher Finlay, Is Just War Possible? (Cambridge: Pol-
ity, 2018).
66. Some might prefer to reformulate (2) thus: “(2’) People have a right to defend
themselves from severe wrongs.” If they can also waive their defensive rights, then my argu-
ments about conflicting duties—not to kill, to protect others—would seem to be moot.
One reply is that, even if I decide to waive my rights, I might still be under an obligation
to save others if the substance of (2) is also correct. And so even if we started from a more
egoistical account based on (2’), we’d still default to the altruistic account above.
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that the law should always win out over moral reasons that are at odds
with the law: whether it does so depends on which duty is more compel-
ling in the circumstances.67 An authoritative judgment capable of obli-
gating combatants in a particular just war generally would require, first,
careful attention to the details of the case and, second, an ability to per-
suade enough combatants to accept the decision for a sufficient expec-
tation of success. For this reason, judgment will most likely need to be
informed by an authoritative leadership of some sort.68
V. CONCLUSION
Haque’s analysis is exemplary in showing how themethods characteristic
of recent revisionist, cosmopolitan ethics can help understand and im-
prove the law. But I am inclined to resist his conclusions about the rela-
tionship between morality and war in two important respects.
First, moral theory—which, in this field, means just war theory—
cannot be expected to perform an entirely subservient role in relation
to the LOAC. It remains important as a direct guide to action in at least
some dimensions of the ethics of war. This is partly due to the potential
for moral conflict in which the reasons for following the law aren’t suf-
ficient to prevail against those militating against doing so. The relevant
reasons are defined by moral duties that soldiers ought to make the ut-
most efforts to satisfy as far as possible. Soldiers risk three sorts of moral
wrongdoing in addition to the wrongful killings whose avoidance moti-
vates adherence to NCI. First, they risk killing in unjust wars. If soldiers
refuse the service of just war theory and rely solely on the state to indi-
cate when to fight, then they have no means of minimizing this danger.
The opposing risk, second, is that, by adopting just war theory as an ad-
ditional source of guidance, combatants may be led to consider cases
for illegal action: the use of terror bombing, for instance, or some sort
of morally rather than legally targeted killing.69 So just war theory, too,
poses a risk. But then there is also a third risk, which is that if they
were to reject just war theory for the sake of avoiding the second risk, sol-
diers would also fail to discharge urgent moral duties to win in wars for
“deadly serious causes.”70 This would arise if the only way of winning them
was by means of morally justifiable but legally prohibited tactics such as
67. See McMahan, “Morality of War,” 37–39.
68. On rival leaders, see Allen Buchanan, “The Ethics of Revolution and Its Implica-
tions for the Ethics of Intervention,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 41 (2013): 291–323, 293,
298–99.
69. See, e.g., Walzer’s theory of Supreme Emergency in Just and Unjust Wars.
70. Christopher J. Finlay, “The Deadly Serious Causes of Legitimate Armed Resis-
tance: Between the Wrongs of Terrorism and the Crimes of War,” Criminal Law and Philos-
ophy 12 (2018): 271–87.
Finlay Justification and Legitimacy at War 601
This content downloaded from 129.234.039.154 on June 13, 2019 06:36:22 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
those discussed in Section IV. These multiple risks and the ever-present
potential for conflict between morality and law mean that the sources
of moral guidance remain irreducibly plural. Citizens, soldiers, and com-
batants must take both the law and the moral perspective of just war the-
ory into account and, in doing so, must frequently supplement these
sources with guidance—where available and reliable—from those politi-
cal authorities that may apply to them.
Second,my conclusions sit uncomfortably in someways withHaque’s
statement of the “cosmopolitan” assumption that “the moral norms gov-
erning violence in war generally reflect ourmoral status as human beings
andonly interstitially reflect our special relationships” (LMW, 9).My anal-
ysis of the ways in which specific loci of actual or emerging political au-
thority are called upon to fill normative lacunae both within the LOAC
andbetween law andmorality suggests that some caveats to the cosmopol-
itan assumption are in order. Insofar as the existing international legal
order depends on states—or state-like entities—to specify the meaning
of the LOAC, efforts to comply with the law of war have an unavoidably
particularistic bent. This puts soldiers’ normative guidance under the
law in tension with the moral pull of cosmopolitan commitments. The
“moral norms governing violence in war”necessarily reflect an admixture
of both cosmopolitan concerns with human beings as ends and the cur-
rently highly particularistic institutional-political frameworks through
which individuals seek to discharge duties toward them. To put it another
way, the interstices between cosmopolitan norms are rather wide. The re-
sulting picture of norms in war is therefore more heterogeneous than
Haque’s twin commitments to cosmopolitan morality and the authority
of the LOAC as a means of following it suggest.
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